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ABSTRACT 
Decentralization reforms have been the overwhelming response to failures in the targeting of public 
resources by the central state in developing countries. The policy debate on decentralization typically 
revolves around several a priori hypotheses on how the design of formal institutions of local government, 
such as electoral rules, affects accountability in the provision and targeting of public goods. Yet a 
growing body of research suggests that many rules that structure political incentives and policy outcomes 
are informal. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that informal rules such as legislative norms and 
clientelism can strongly influence political behavior and policy outcomes. This evidence makes a 
compelling case for both the impact of these informal institutions on political incentives and their role in 
complementing formal institutions and shaping the status quo when formal venues are absent or weak. 
How much do these formal institutions matter? How do they shape policy outcomes? In particular, do 
they merely substitute for weak or absent formal institutions or do they exist alongside and dominate 
these formal rules and institutions? In this paper, we examine the effect of informal institutions on 
decentralized public-resource allocation in Ghana. The decentralization policy debate in Ghana, as 
elsewhere, typically focuses on the role of formal institutions of local government in the targeting of local 
public resources. Through a comparative case study of two districts in northern Ghana, we argue that 
informal institutions, grounded in the rationale of partisan politics of the central state, are the key 
determinants of decentralized public-resource allocation outcomes. In particular, we show that this 
political rationale is expressed through an informal model of vote buying, and this vote buying is dictated 
by a national political agenda. Our findings suggest that ignoring this informal institution is likely to 
undermine the current efforts to reform decentralized public-resource allocation in Ghana. 
Keywords:  local government, informal institutions, decentralization, local public goods vi 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Failures in the provision and targeting of public goods and services have long been a concern in the 
developing world. Analyses of direct spending by central government programs in several countries 
consistently show that such spending favors regions that are more politically important for the central 
government (Khemani 200). Given the importance of public services to poverty alleviation and 
development (Besley and Ghatak 2004; World Bank 2004 such mistargeting is expected to have serious 
developmental consequences. The failure of central governments to equitably distribute resources across 
regions and social divisions has been rooted in failures of accountability to these groups. Decentralization, 
defined herein as the devolution of political decision making power to local governments, has been the 
overwhelming response to failures of centralized governance in developing countries. A priori it is 
supposed that local politicians’ accountability to a smaller number of voters for electoral success and 
local constituents’ greater information about the performance of their representatives dampen the 
incentives to target resources to disproportionately benefit certain communities or specific social groups. 
Following this logic (or pressured by donors who do), states in a growing number of countries have 
shifted a considerable amount of resources to be distributed at the discretion of local governments. 
Local political and administrative actors in many places thus play a newly significant role in 
affecting the targeting and allocation of public goods. While these decentralization reforms hold the 
potential to address these targeting failures, it is also widely acknowledged that formal rules  of 
governance, implemented as they are by weak institutions tend to be weak in developing country contexts 
(Bardhan 2002). The limits of these formal rules of governance could then limit the potential of these 
reforms. The debate on the effect of decentralization reforms typically revolves around the question of 
how the design of formal institutions of local government affects concepts such as accountability and 
democracy in the provision and targeting of public goods (Ayee 2005, Besley et al 2004, Crook 1994, 
Crook and Manor 2008). However, evidence from some countries suggests that these formal institutions 
do not explain political incentives and therefore the subsequent policy outcomes (Desposato 2006). In 
China, for example, local officials compensated for the state’s inability to raise revenues and provide 
public goods by mobilizing resources through the temple and lineage associations of which they were a 
part (Tsai 2007). In the Indian state of Karnataka, traditional village leaders bolstered the authority of 
newly elected local council members in some instances, while competing with them in others (Ananthpur 
2002). Hence informal institutions can complement or substitute for ineffective formal institutions as in 
the case of China, or they can define, depending on the context, the incentives to comply with formal 
rules or subvert new formal structures of the state as in the case of Karnataka. Indeed, these examples are 
part of a growing body of evidence that suggests that many rules” that structure political life are informal 
and that these rules are created, communicated, and enforced outside formal channels (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004). This evidence on informal institutions makes a compelling case for considering both the 
impact of these informal institutions on political incentives and their role in complementing formal 
institutions and shaping the political outcomes when formal institutions are absent or weak (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004). The key questions then are as follows: How much do these informal institutions matter? 
How do they shape policy outcomes? 
 In this paper, we examine how informal institutions of decentralized public-resource allocation 
work (if they do) in the case of Ghana. The decentralization policy debate in Ghana, as elsewhere, focuses 
on the role of formal institutions of local government in the targeting of local public resources. Through a 
comparative case study of two districts in northern Ghana, we identify the informal institutions that are 
pertinent to public-resource allocation outcomes, and we examine how these institutions influence the 
decentralized targeting of public resources. 
 Ghana, with its relatively new class of political leaders and decentralized institutions of local 
government, presents a particularly interesting case to study. While the decentralization reforms that have 
been adopted are far from complete, they have shifted a significant amount of resources to local 
governments or District Assemblies (DAs) along with the devolution of what appears to be legitimate 2 
political power to local representatives (Crook and Manor 1998). DAs, therefore, now serve as the node 
for the within-district targeting of village- or community-level public goods. Comparing two districts with 
identical formal rules of decentralized targeting allows us to isolate the effect of informal institutions 
while holding the effect of the formal rules constant. 
The majority of work on policies of decentralized provision and targeting of public goods has 
hitherto focused on the Indian case and more specifically on a formal rule of mandated representation. 
What emerges is that the performance of the formal mandate in Indian local government is highly context 
specific and varies across different implementation strategies, institutions of accountability, and one could 
hypothesize, informal institutions (Palaniswamy and Krishnan 2008; Ban and Rao 2008a, 2008b; Besley, 
Pande, and Rao 2007; Besley and Ghatak2004; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
2004).Even within this growing literature, there is nearly no evidence on the form and nature of informal 
institutions that simultaneously determine policy outcomes. In Ghana, the decentralization policy debate 
has focused largely on how the formal structures of local government affect the process of 
decentralization (for example, is it participatory or democratic?). It rarely considers what shapes the 
outcomes of decentralization, as measured by resource allocation to needy populations, and completely 
fails to consider the critical impact of informal institutions—either preexisting ones or those created 
alongside new formal rules—on outcomes. 
That informal institutions matter to the targeting of local public goods is evident from the story 
told by our case studies. We argue that informal institutions, grounded in the rationale of partisan party 
politics of the central state, are the key determinant of decentralized public- resource allocation. In 
particular, we show that this political rationale is expressed through an informal model of vote buying and 
that this vote buying is dictated by a national political agenda. Our findings also suggest that ignoring this 
informal institution is likely to undermine the current efforts to reform formal institutions of decentralized 
public-resource allocation in Ghana. How institutions of local government should be structured so as to 
ensure a fair and efficient use of public resources is a central issue in the debate on the role of 
decentralized governance in improving the quality of government in the developing world (Besley et al. 
2004). 
This paper contributes to this debate in two important ways. First, from a theoretical perspective, 
it contributes to the scarce empirical evidence on the determinants of decentralized public-resource 
allocation outcomes in developing country contexts and to the literature that tests for the impact of 
informal institutions. Second, from a practical standpoint, it contributes to answers to questions of how 
institutions that allocate local public resources should be reformed and strengthened in the Ghanaian 
context. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the formal institutional context 
within which local public goods are allocated in Ghana. Section 3 proposes a model of capture of this 
public-good agenda through informal institutions of local governments. Section 4 describes the research 
design, and sections 5 and 6 discuss the results of our case studies. Section 7 offers concluding remarks. 3 
2.  FORMAL INSTITUTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE TARGETING OF 
LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS IN GHANA 
In 1988, facing domestic and international pressure to democratize, the military administration of Jerry 
John Rawlings and his Provisional National Defense Council initiated Ghana’s current decentralization 
program. These decentralization reforms, which were institutionalized in the Constitution of the Fourth 
Republic four years later, created a multitiered local-government structure. The upper tier of this 
government is the District Assembly (DA), the highest political authority in the newly demarcated 
districts. The DA serves as a legislative body and is made up of elected and appointed members. It 
includes an executive unit that is meant to incorporate under 22 deconcentrated line departments (of 
specific ministries of government). The legal framework for local governments assigns the DA with 86 
total functions, most of which are related to local service provisions including those related to health, 
education, agriculture, public works, communications, and public safety (Ayee 1995. The DA also has 
responsibility for district planning and budgeting and the authority to collect taxes, tender contracts, and 
pass bylaws. In practice, however, instead of a broad formal mandate for the responsibility of specific 
services, the DA is assigned the narrower task of providing and allocating (targeting) local public goods 
within the district. For example, in the case of education, the DA is tasked with providing specific public 
goods relevant to education, such as school buildings. The overall responsibility for the provision of 
education, however, lies with several actors, most of whom are either outside the local government, are 
not accountable to the local government or both. 
While DAs have some funds that can be used entirely at their discretion, it is often the case that 
the use of these funds is biased toward more visible physical infrastructure investments, and "soft 
investments," such as school quality, are most often not a preferred use of public resources. Political 
incentives that are stacked against such “invisible” investments offer a clear explanation for such a pattern 
(Keefer and Khemani 2005). Providing local public goods—that are located in particular towns or 
villages (henceforth, called communities)—is, therefore, the primary mandate of the DA. Therefore, DAs 
are the key providers of community-based public infrastructure such as schools, clinics, latrines, roads, 
and water services, which garner clear political credit. 
Local public goods provided by the DA are largely financed from two sources. The first source, 
the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF), is a central government grant that is allocated to districts 
based on a parliament-approved formula. The second source is comprised of donor funds that are 
devolved, typically through specific projects, directly for the district. In our two study districts, the DACF  
accounted for between (29% to 51% with an average of 38% )  one-total district expenditures while donor 
funds (from multilateral and bilateral donors) accounted for (31.8% to 54.2%, average 41%). of total 
district expenditures. Together, these two funds account for at least 75%  of total district expenditures
1
The DA is formally headed by the district chief executive (DCE), a presidential appointee with 
far-reaching political and administrative influence within the district. The Constitution of Ghana 
mandates the DCE to chair the Executive Committee of the DA, which sits atop the DA subcommittee 
system (Ayee 1995; Crook and Manor 1998; Crook 1994). As such, the DCE must approve all decisions 
made by the elected and appointed membership of the DA. As the chair of the District Tender Board, the 
DCE plays a significant role in awarding contracts. As the chief executive officer, the DCE signs off on 
all expenditures, correspondences, and public statements of the DA administration. Indeed, the formal 
rules that mandate the DCE as the head of the district accord overwhelming powers to this nonelected and 
. 
The majority of the DACF funds are not tied to use, and the DAs decide on the questions of what public 
goods to provide and where to locate them. However, donor funds are typically tied to use, and the DA 
merely makes the decision of where to locate them. The task of targeting local public goods, therefore, 
rests primarily with the DA. 
                                                       
1 The remainder of district expenditure comes from special grants from the central government( 4% to 23% with an average 
of 14%  ) and internally generated funds (1% to 14% with an average of 5.7%). 4 
politically partisan head of the local government; the amount of discretion the DCE wields over 
management of DA affairs and its resources cannot be overstated. 
The DCE also sits atop the legislative and the bureaucratic institutions of the DA. The legislative 
institution of the DA includes both elected members who represent specific electoral areas and appointed 
members. Two-thirds of all members are elected, and appointed members are intended to be prominent 
citizens of the district drawn from different walks of life. Formally, this legislature is supposed to make 
and approve all decisions made in the DA. Yet, because of structural imperfections of the decentralization 
system that grants power over management and budgetary decisions to the executive office of the DCE, 
this legislative institution of local government exercises close to no control over the affairs of the DA 
(Ayee 1995, Ayee 1996, Crook and Manor 1998; Crook 1994). The formal rules also envisaged that the 
elected members of the DA would serve as locally rooted advocates for development in the communities 
that they represent. These elected members were, and are, for the most part genuinely “representative” of 
their electorates. A large majority of them fulfilled official injunctions to work closely with their 
communities in eliciting needs and in representing these needs to the DA (Ayee 1990, Crook 2004, Crook 
and Manor 1998). It is also widely acknowledged that the DCE dominates the bureaucratic institutions of 
local government. This domination is manifest in the routine subversion of planning mandates with which 
the bureaucracy is formally tasked. The de facto devolution of powers, both political and administrative, 
to local actors is then significantly more limited than that envisaged by the formal rules. 
This de facto form of decentralization is depicted in Figure 1, where the solid lines represent the 
de facto rules that that govern the allocation of local public resources and the broken lines represent the 
ineffective nature of the formal rules of public resource allocation. 
Figure 1. De facto decentralization in Ghana 
  
Source: Authors, based on key informant interviews 
The decentralized provision of public goods typically calls for the devolution of power away from 
the hitherto all-powerful central state. Yet, de facto, decentralization in Ghana is characterized by the 
domination of the formal institutions of local government—both political and bureaucratic—by an 
appointee of the central government. This dichotomy between the powers that should be devolved and 
that are devolved is, however, not particular to the Ghanaian case. In the 1980s, in Kenya the form of 5 
administrative decentralization was closely tied to the political ambitions of President Moi (Barkan and 
Chege 1989). More recently, the state legislature in the Indian state of Karnataka tried to pass a bill that 
sought to limit the powers currently accorded to local governments in the state(India Together,2009). That 
political considerations of the central government play a role in designing de facto devolution to local 
governments is not surprising. Indeed, Devarajan, Khemani, and Shah (2008) call this phenomenon of 
limited devolution to local governments “partial decentralization,” and they suggest that this phenomenon 
could, in part, reflect an attempt by higher-level governments to hold on to political power, financial 
power, or both. Khemani (2010) argues that such partial decentralization is selected by politicians in the 
face of increasing participation by swing voters in elections and that this choice facilitates the vote buying 
imperatives of the central government. Vote buying, in this model, is manifest in the provision of targeted 
and clientelistic transfers to swing voters; such vote buying supersedes the importance of providing more 
broad-based public goods. 
In this model, the political capture of local governments is the result of the political imperatives 
created by swing voters; however, it has implications only for the design of formal institutions of local 
government. In particular, it results in the creation of formal jurisdictions of local government that are 
both grant dependent and small. Formal rules, which govern the design of how local public goods are 
provided and the institutions of local government, then take precedence in this explanation of the political 
economy of decentralized public-good provision. The relevance of informal institutions to political 
behaviors and outcomes, however, suggests this exclusive focus on the formal presents, at best, an 
incomplete explanation for observed policy outcomes. Indeed, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) argue that a 
key motivation for creating informal institutions emerges when certain goals—such as the centralized 
control of public service provision—are not considered publicly acceptable. The inconspicuousness of 
informal institutions allows the pursuit of these unacceptable goals. The questions that emerge  are the 
following: What are informal institutions of local government that are associated with this political 
economy of decentralized public-good provision? How do these informal institutions matter to the 
observed public-good provision and targeting outcomes? Indeed, if informal institutions trump formal 
rules, as they do in several instances (See Helmke and Levitsky (2004) for examples),
  then an exclusively 
formal explanation can be both misleading and incomplete. 
We propose a model where the political capture of local governments takes place through 
informal institutions. 6 
3.  CAPTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS THROUGH INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
We propose a model of political capture of the public-good provision agenda of local governments, and 
we argue that this capture takes place through informal institutions. 
Even when the responsibility for service provision has been formally transferred to local 
governments, central governments may still have incentives to assume responsibility for service 
provision; that is, they are motivated when citizens reward them for such provision. In a system of partial 
decentralization, citizens continue to place their expectations of service delivery with national 
governments. Indeed, citizens are more likely to punish national politicians rather than local ones for 
inadequacies of service delivery (Devarajan, Khemani, and Shah 2007). The strength of these political 
incentives, however, depends on the relevance and strength of identity- based voting when citizens vote 
based on fixed social identities (Keefer and Khemani 2005). When identity-based voting is widely 
prevalent, politicians are less likely to be judged on their record on public service provision. When such 
voting is less relevant, and voters tend to be swing voters, there are clear political incentives to capture the 
public-service provision agenda of local governments (Khemani 2010). 
How does such capture take place? The question of how, or the mechanism through which such 
capture takes place, has hitherto focused on formal institutions. In contrast, we argue that informal 
institutions are more likely to shape, enforce, and mediate such capture. Indeed, informal institutions have 
been known to shape the performance of formal institutions in unexpected ways, mediate the effect of 
formal rules, and create and strengthen incentives to comply with formal rules. In this context, ignoring 
these institutions could even lead to misleading explanations for observed policy outcomes (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004).While formal rules and institutions of local government could reflect political capture (as 
in Khemani 2010), we argue that an exclusively formal explanation of such capture is, at best, partial. 
Following Helmke and Levitsky (2004), we define informal institutions as “socially shared rules, 
usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned (formal) 
channels.” In this paper, vote buying is defined as the strategic targeting of local public goods so as to 
garner political credit (votes) from the group that has access to the public good (Diaz Cayeros and 
Maglioni2003). In particular, it does not refer to clientelistic and other private transfers targeted to 
individual voters.
2
While the formal rules stipulate that elections to the District Assembly (DA) be nonpartisan, it is 
widely acknowledged in Ghana that these elections are, in fact, partisan and that the local machineries of 
political parties play a critical role in the elections. National elections in Ghana are also closely contested. 
Indeed, studies of the empirical determinants of voting show that Ghanaian elections are unpredictable 
and that the large majority of voters are swing voters who do not vote, on account of ethnic or other 
identities, on fixed party lines. In particular, the vast majority of Ghanaian voters do not identify through 
fixed identities with either of the two major political parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) 
and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). (Bossuroy 2007; Fridy 2007). As Fridy (2007) points out, the vast 
majority of Ghanaian voters view the major political parties- the NPP and the NDC as representative of 
Asante and Ewe (two major ethnic groups that typically align on fixed party lines) interests respectively. 
Therefore, the majority of these voters do not themselves vote as a block; instead they base their 
evaluations of the Asante and Ewe parties ultimately on issues other than ethnicity. This makes the 
electoral game for votes a closely fought one. The control over the provision of local public goods could 
be a very valuable tool in any attempt to win these elections. 
 At the time of this study, such clientilistic transfers to voters were limited within the 
scope programs implemented by both the district governments in Ghana. 
In this context, vote buying, on account of political imperatives, can take two forms. The first 
form of vote buying is manifest in the agency of the central government that is built into the formal 
design of decentralization policy (as is typical in a system of partial decentralization). The second form 
                                                       
2 Such vote buying, through pork barrel politics, is indeed a strategy used by governments all over the developed and 
developing world. 7 
takes place through the informal institutions that are manifest in party machineries and that either operate 
alongside or dominate formal institutions of local government. 
Both forms of capture, through the formal and the informal institutions, are determined by the 
electoral logic facing the central government. Following this logic, central politicians are likely to court 
electoral support through the strategic targeting of the provision of public goods. This implies that 
patterns of public good provision vary across the country and that these decisions depend on the nature of 
the electoral market in place. In regions of established support for a political party, where citizens vote 
based on fixed party identities (ethnic or otherwise), governments are likely to continue to court support 
through the provision of goods to the these core support groups. In regions where voters are not already 
so committed, they are more likely to hold politicians accountable for inadequacies in service delivery. 
Service provision then tends to be broader based in these swing regions relative to the regions of core 
support. Closely contested national elections, however, mean that to win elections, national politicians 
need to target both core and swing voters. Hence, national politicians faced with partial decentralization 
and with electoral competition have incentives to capture the provision of local public goods. In systems 
with entrenched political parties, party machineries are likely to naturally aid in this capture. 
The incentives that underlie both formal and informal institutions through which vote buying is 
implemented lie in the nature of electoral markets, and party machineries are likely to be pertinent to both 
institutions. Even the formal institutions of local government—be it the creation of small grant-financed 
jurisdictions (see Khemani 2010) or the formal appointment of a central agent as the head of the district as 
in Ghana—are likely to require a mechanism through which vote buying can be mediated and enforced. 
For example, even when jurisdictions are dependent on the central government grants, the knowledge of 
how these grants should be allocated across jurisdictions is likely to come from institutions associated 
with the central government, such as parties and their machines, rather than the head of the state and the 
executive alone. However, political parties have not been accorded a formal role in local government in 
most decentralization reforms adopted by developing countries. This implies that the political party, or 
other informal institutions of a similar nature, cannot find a public profile through the formal institutions 
of local government. 
We hypothesize that within a context of a system with contested elections and strong party 
machineries, political capture is likely to take place through informal institutions of vote buying. We also 
hypothesize that such vote buying through informal institutions is likely to be the dominant determinant 
of targeting local public goods. Following Helmke and Levitsky's (2004) classification of informal 
institutions, we consider vote buying as a competing informal institution, where a competing informal 
institution is defined as an institution that structures incentives in ways that are incompatible with the 
formal rules. While the divergence from intended policy outcomes is not surprising per se, and while this 
can be inferred from the formal agency of the central government in local government affairs, the 
questions of how and why the divergent outcomes are obtained are of critical importance. We argue that 
informal institutions constitute a critical part of the answer to why. We now examine, through a 
comparative case study, whether these hypotheses hold in the case of Ghana. 8 
4.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
Ghanaian districts, with their differences in the nature of political competition (electoral markets) and the 
associated differences in political incentives, provide a perfect opportunity to test our hypotheses on the 
informal institutions of vote buying. In particular, the differences in the nature of political competition, or 
electoral markets, across districts allow us to test if the provision of public goods is strategically targeted 
as a model of vote buying through informal institutions would predict. Examining the variation in patterns 
of public service allocation within the same country also allows us to hold constant the force of the formal 
rules of governance in general and those of decentralized targeting of public goods in particular. This then 
allows us to isolate the role of informal institutions associated with electoral markets in determining 
outcomes. It is also widely acknowledged in Ghana that these elections are, in fact, partisan and that the 
local machineries of political parties play a critical role in the elections. Indeed, there is extensive 
anecdotal though little systematic evidence on the importance of political parties in both local and 
national elections. The presence of partisan local politics alongside differences in the nature of electoral 
markets presents us an ideal setting within which the role of informal institutions of vote buying might be 
tested. 
The research reported here was conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(lFPRI) during February and March 2008 in two neighboring districts in the northern region of Ghana. A 
multiple-case embedded research design was used, meaning that data was not pooled across the sample 
but rather clustered into cases (Yin, 2004). The primary unit of analysis was the individual service-
delivery case (for example, a school, borehole, or electricity line). However, because each individual case 
of resource allocation is embedded in and predicted\by political institutions that operate at the 
community, electoral area (EA), and District Assembly (DA) levels, data used in the analysis of each case 
were collected at each of these levels. An EA is defined at the sub district level. Each DA in Ghana 
comprises several EAs, each of which is represented by an elected member of the DA (referred to as the 
“assembly member” or “assembly person”). This assembly member typically represents more than one 
village or community. 
The case studies covered 10 communities in six EAs in two districts. A larger IFPRI survey on 
decentralization and rural service delivery in Ghana ,that was conducted in March 2008 ,defined the 
sampling strategy for the district pairs chosen. This survey covered 3 district pairs
3
In each district, the case studies profiled the district chief executive (DCE), (several) bureaucrats 
of the local government, and three assembly persons. Each of the assembly persons represented the 
chosen EAs. These EAs were selected based on their definition by multiple sources as "high-performing" 
as well as consideration of heterogeneity in gender, tenure, age, strategy, and religion. The profiles 
included information on individual cases of service delivery and the determinants of each of these 
individual cases. The major data collection techniques were key informant interviews, including home 
stays
 (6 districts in total) in 
three different agro-ecological zones of Ghana. The chosen district pair in the northern region presents us 
with a very interesting variation: one district is widely identified as a district that votes based on fixed 
party lines while the other district in the pair is the quintessential swing voting one. Three EAs were 
sampled in each district. These EAs were also a subset of a random sample of assembly people covered 
by the 2008 FPRI decentralization and rural service delivery survey. 
4
Because our primary unit of analysis, the individual service-delivery case, is located at the level 
of the community, we also collected data at the community level. Where the sampled assembly people 
represented more than one community, two communities were studied: the assembly person’s hometown 
, focus group discussions with community opinion leaders, and community meetings. Secondary 
data on the provision of local public goods was also collected from the Electoral Commission and the 
DA. 
                                                       
3 The district pairs were chosen to illuminate the effect of different DA administrations within similar physical, social, and 
financial environments. The inclusion of one district headed by a female district chief executive was also a factor in the selection. 
4 interviewers stayed in the homes of  respondents for several days at a stretch and observed and interviewed them. 9 
and either the biggest or the farthest community. The biggest communities yielded insights about 
assembly people’s accountability to locations with high service pressures and the farthest communities 
revealed intra-EA dynamics created by spatial dispersion in rural areas. 
Our study districts—called districts “A” and “B” (in order to preserve anonymity of the 
respondents)—offer two models of electoral markets, each of which define a different model of vote 
buying. Of our two districts, B has a long history of supporting one political party, while district A is 
known to be a swing voting district. Indeed, the sitting member of parliament from this district does not 
come from the current ruling party. Our districts also differ ethnically and politically. District A is one of 
the most ethnically diverse in the region, and the dominant and most populous ethnic group is long known 
as one that does not identify ethnically with either of the two major parties. District B, in contrast, is more 
ethnically homogenous and has historically been tied to a single party, with this fixity being rooted in 
more fixed and inflammatory ethnic identities. The dominant (and most populous) ethnic group in the 
district has been characterized as lifelong supporters of a single party, and this calcified identity is based 
on their sub-ethnic group. Table 1 presents basic demographic information, ethnic fractionalization 
indices, and information on the local government structures from the two districts. 
Table 1. Selected district statistics 
  District A  District B 
Area  17,317 km
2  2,389 km
2 
Population  76,702 (2000)  132,880 (2000) 
Population density  8/km
2  55/km
2 
Poverty head count ratio  57.2  83.5 
Ethnic fractionalization index  0.66  0.19 
     
Number of area councils  6  12 
Number of electoral areas  20  42 
Unit committees inaugurated  74 percent (2007)  7 percent (2007) 
Number of communities  102  220 
Total funds received in 2007  1,903,267 GHS  2,014,748 GHS 
Internally Generated Funds  7.6 percent  12.1 percent 
Funds per capita  24.8 GHS  15.1 GHS 
Source: Authors compilations from 2003 QWIC surveys and DA data. 
Note: No census has been conducted since the District A was bifurcated: so population estimates for district B are an estimate. 
The value of the funds received in 2007 includes an estimate for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) funds- this estimate 
is based on the average of the preceding two years. 
Our study districts neighbor each other in Ghana’s disadvantaged northern region and are 
predominantly agricultural, with more than 85 percent of the population categorized as rural. District A 
boasts the lowest poverty rate in the region (Table 1). With a substantial population reduction when part 
of the district was carved off to create a new one, its total funds available per capita are also more than 
twice that of its more populous neighbor. Nonetheless, district A still remains a large district, and this size 
defines the service delivery challenges for the DA. Mobility challenges caused by low road density and 
low access to services centered in the district capital, such as secondary schools, hospitals, and 
agricultural extension are particular constraints. 
The DA of district B serves a much larger and poorer population. More than 80 percent of the 
district residents fall below the poverty line, and the per capita expenditure is much lower than in the 
neighboring district. Yet in recent years, total revenues in district B have roughly equaled those of its 
neighbor. 10 
Nevertheless, as Table 2 shows, district B has similar or better access to major infrastructure, 
notably roads and social services, compared to district A. One reason for this may be its much closer 
proximity to and linkages with the regional capital; many staff commute daily from there to their jobs in 
the district. However, providing clean drinking water remains a severe challenge in the southern half of 
the district, where the water table is too low for tapping. Additionally, Guinea worm -a parasitic disease 
that is contracted from open water sources - is endemic to the region, and while district A has eradicated 
this parasite, most open water sources in district B remain contaminated. Our study districts, therefore, 
represent a case where access to services does not have a clear relationship with poverty. Indeed, the 
district with better services is poorer. 
Table 2. Access to services in the study districts 
  District A  District B  Region 
Poverty head count ratio  57.2  83.5  - 
Access to safe water source (2007)  53.2   54.1  54.4 
Access to sanitation  8.1  19.5  23.5 
Road density    .04  .15  - 
Access to roads  48   77.1  - 
Access to electricity  14.3  18.4  28.8 
Access to health facilities  41.3  54.2  35.0 
Access to primary school  80.8  96.7  80.1 
Source: Authors compilations from 2003 QWIC surveys and DA data. 
Note. All access figures refer to the percentage of households in the district who have access to the given public good or service. 11 
5.  INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT TARGETING LOCAL 
PUBLIC GOODS IN GHANA 
In this section, we draw on the results from our case studies to demonstrate that informal institutions are 
an empirically relevant and important determinant of vote buying in Ghana. Vote buying influences the 
targeting of local public goods in three important ways. First, it influences this distribution through the 
incentives faced by the district chief executive (DCE. These incentives then result in the exercise of the 
formal mandate of general oversight of the affairs of the District Assemblies (DAs) in rather far-reaching 
ways. Second, vote buying influences the distribution of the local public goods through the informal 
domination by the DCE of both the legislative and bureaucratic institutions of the DA. Third, vote buying 
rather paradoxically make the informally disempowered elected members of the DA work as true 
advocates on behalf of their constituents. We now examine each of these informal institutions. 
Vote Buying through the Office of the District Chief Executive 
“I am a politician. I am here to implement the programs of my government. My job is to work for my 
party, to help my party do well in the elections.” —District chief executive, C14 
There is a common consensus in Ghana that the work of the DAs is tinged by partisan 
considerations, largely because of the clear political allegiance of the district’s most important actor. Per 
the constitutional statute that created it, the DA system is officially nonpartisan (Secs. 248.1-2, 
Constitution of Ghana).
5
To win votes and increase party penetration, however, the DCE must use DA resources to woo 
communities. The following two observations point to the mechanics of electoral markets in play. A 
planning officer noted: 
 Yet at the helm of the local government sits an unconcealed partisan. The DCE 
is appointed by the President of the Republic of Ghana and can be removed by him/her at will. In fact, 
individuals interested in the post apply directly to the party machinery: Party executives at the 
constituency level handle recruitment, while the regional minister, minister of local government, and 
office of the president vet, interview, and nominate applicants. This selection process means that DCEs 
are first and foremost accountable to the national party machinery of the ruling party, a fact well 
documented in the literature on Ghana’s decentralization (Ayee 2003, Ayee 1996). As an explicitly 
partisan actor, the DCE faces two types of political pressures. First, as a political appointee of the ruling 
party, one of the DCE’s key performance measures is his/her ability to increase the penetration of the 
ruling party in the district. As one DCE opined, “At the end of the day, if you are there and you don’t 
make an impact for the party, your stay might as well have been useless.” Second, DCEs are often major 
contenders for the parliamentary seat in their district, taking advantage of their proximity to the 
constituency relative to the Accra-based member of parliament (MP). Both these political pressures make 
the DCE a key player in electoral markets for national political gains. 
Which community gets what is politically based. Because our current 
government has its supporters in some communities, okay. It will 
prioritize giving projects to such communities that support the current 
government more than those that do not support. Every government 
wants to stay in power. And that actually determines the siting of 
projects more than other factor. 
                                                       
5 Secs. 248.1-2: Candidates seeking election to a District Assembly (or lower local government unit) may not affiliate with 
any political symbol, and no political party can endorse, sponsor, or campaign for a candidate.
6 
A8,A9,A10,A11,A14,A15,A17,A27- Respondent numbers, assigned to preserve anonymity of respondents. 12 
In contrast, several DCEs argued that if there was any bias in their allocation decisions, it was, in 
fact, in favor of opposition communities. These competing observations lay out the two underlying 
political rationales of local electoral markets. It follows that the DCEs, therefore, need to buy votes, and 
how they do this depends on the nature of the electoral market. If a DCE presides over a district with 
several swing voters then the allocation of public goods needs to be more broad based. In a politically 
unpredictable region, public goods clearly need to reach a wider range of communities as targeting core 
support is no longer a sufficient strategy to win elections. If, however, the district has several voters who 
vote, for whatever reason, along fixed party lines, then public goods need only be targeted to those 
communities that offer their loyal support. Therefore, while public-resource allocation decisions in core 
voting regions might resemble a quid pro quo or patronage, these decisions are in effect determined by the 
underlying political logic of electoral markets. This logic finds expression through the exercise of wide-
ranging informal authority by the central government through the office of the DCE. Indeed, vote buying 
is the ubiquitous response to this logic, and it emerges as a critical determinant of public resource 
allocation in the status quo. 
The incentives of the DCE to act in the genuine interest of the party are driven by political 
aspirations. Indeed, the tussle between the aspirations of the DCE to be an MP and the aspirations of the 
sitting MP have been well documented (Ayee, 2003). The thoughts of a DCE planning to run for MP in 
the nearest national election will turn toward campaign finance, which hinges on doling out favors, 
especially to wealthy party activists. This means that the DCE’s own political aspirations provide the 
pressure to channel resources to instrumental individuals. The DCE, as chair of the Tender Board, has a 
strong influence over who work on DA contracts. Where contractors are also district-party power brokers, 
our evidence suggests that the DCE may give them undue preference to win their support.  
In the district where contractors in the district did not have close ties to the DCE’s party, there 
were fewer party-based pressures to favor certain contractors over others. Indeed, several people
6
In both the political imperatives and contracting pressures facing the DCE, therefore, political 
parties play a critical role in brokering the status quo. Indeed, despite the formal nonpartisanship in the 
DA, partisan political imperatives are the driving force behind the capture of the targeting of public 
resources.  
 in the 
district noted that “[DCE] party people are not contractors, except one man in community x”. In the 
district where the candidate was running for MP in the upcoming elections and where [DCE] party had a 
strong presence, it was reported that the party machinery played a key role in handing out contracts and 
therefore locating public goods. Indeed, a number of observers also pointed out that the need to favor 
particular contractors meant that the parts of the district where these contractors had a dominant presence 
would be favored in the provision of public goods. Hence, our evidence shows that the strength of the 
party machinery and the instrumental value of this machinery to the DCE are critical in linking campaign 
finance pressures to the targeting of community-based public goods. In particular, a weak presence of the 
party machinery in the district reduces such campaign finance–induced biases in the targeting. Party 
machineries and their instrumental value to DCEs, therefore, play a critical role in connecting the dots 
from the political rationale defined by electoral markets to vote buying in the allocation of local public 
goods. Indeed, the political rationale is consistent with the incentives of the key political actors in the 
DA—the DCEs. The fulfillment of the latters’ current and future aspirations hinge upon how useful they 
are to the goal of increased party penetration. 
Vote Buying through the Domination of Political Institutions of Local Government 
I thought the truth came from assemblyman. But now that I'm going to 
assembly I'm thinking that the [assemblymen] don't have truth. No, you 
must crucify yourself before your people can get the good services. All I 
am is a glorified beggar.—Assembly member, B10 
                                                       
6 A8,A9,A10,A11,A14,A15,A17,A27- Respondent numbers, assigned to preserve anonymity of respondents. 13 
Despite the formal assignment of power for the within-district distribution of local public goods 
to the institution of the DA, it is widely known that the DCE makes the final decision on this distribution 
(Ayee 1995; Crook and Manor 1998; Crook 1994). However, we find that despite their limited powers, 
assembly members are not passive observers in the DA. Rather, the most effective of them act as 
lobbyists, working vigorously to attract resources to the communities within their constituency. Indeed 
assembly members lobby all people for all things- -including public goods and services- that they lack. 
Why would these assembly members, who neither exercise control over the resources of the 
district nor receive any meaningful remuneration, go to such lengths to represent their constituents? They 
lobby because they feel accountable, in some sense, and find their position desirable.  Our evidence 
suggests that the desirability of this position seems to be closely tied to the avenue (and associated 
incentives) for upward mobility provided by the party machinery. Several assembly members in our 
sample cited that the desire for upward mobility was the driving force that led them to activate incentive 
structures to win resources in a game of pork-barrel politics controlled by others.
7
However, they too do not know the processes by which they finally merit a project. Indeed, an 
institutional structure that keeps them ignorant of allocation criteria naturally incentivizes pork barrel 
politics as the only action they can take on behalf of their constituents. . Ultimately therefore, individual 
political loyalties and social networks also come into play. How this happens is complicated. In a bid to 
strengthen their chances of success, assembly persons draw heavily on their political connections. In the 
lobbying process, the instrumentality of party chairmen on a ruling is particularly evident. There is 
evidence that at least some assembly members are, in fact, known party activists and that almost all 
identify with a particular party, at least privately.
 We find that the 
rewards from this game of pork barrel depend, in large measure, on the strategic compulsions of the 
electoral politics in play. Assembly members in our sample repeatedly reported that they deployed 
electoral politics in their lobbying strategies by playing into deciding actors’ extant motivations. For 
example, knowing DCEs are concerned with securing the votes of their EAs, assembly members may 
highlight the political case for investing assembly resources in their area. Alternatively they may send the 
party chairman to do so. 
8 The formal rule of a nonpartisan local government 
dictates that members must be strategic in how they publicly wield their party identity to best position 
themselves to extract public goods from the partisan DCE.
9
Assembly members also exploit their social networks in nonparty spheres of influence. Instances 
of influential community members, such as members of the local chief’s house, unit committee 
members,
 As one assembly member said, “Where the 
government is in power, you should have a bit of a close relationships with the [ruling party]  [ward] 
chairman” (assembly member, A4). Even opposition activists at the community level acknowledged the 
expediency of exploiting the potentially fuller access to the DCE enjoyed by ward party chairmen: “If you 
want to go to assembly, seeing that NPP is in power, then they will not listen to any problem unless we 
consult the NPP chairman. So he will lead us to assembly. If they know you are opposition, they won’t 
heed you, but if the chairman leads people, they will listen” (assembly member, A48). 
10
                                                       
7 In this role they also act as the key intermediaries between community and state. 
 and local businesspeople, themselves lobbying on behalf of the assembly person at the DA, 
are frequently cited. It is no surprise that extant political imperatives are drawn upon to dominate the 
institution and the public-good allocation function of the DA. It is, however, imperative to note that the 
8 One MP admitted to sponsoring known National Democratic Congress party members to run for DA positions so that they 
could increase the partisan voting bloc, which was especially relevant during the confirmation of the DCE. 
9 However, a majority of our sample preferred to portray themselves as nonpartisan, often citing the statute that stipulates it. 
One assembly person even recounted a verbal argument engaged with a party executive when he was accused of being a member 
of the opposition party in front of the DCE. For these actors, keeping secret their sympathy for the opposition maintains their 
ability to lobby the DCE on other grounds. In contrast, having a clear opposition party identity will likely close fruitful avenues 
to the DCE. While relevance of revealing party identity is unclear, our evidence on the location of public goods suggests that it is 
electoral logic that determines which communities receive public goods and that the role of political parties are intricately tied to 
this logic. Indeed, our case studies also show that a key lobbying strategy adopted by assembly people is, in fact, to play into the 
extant motivations to increase party penetration in the district. 
10 The unit committee is a unit of local government that sits at the level of the community. 14 
elected members of the assembly—who adopt lobbying as a ubiquitous strategy to bring public goods to 
their communities—are incentivized to do so by the avenues for upward mobility provided through 
political parties. 
Vote buying imperatives dominate the legislative institution of the DA, and this vote buying is 
mediated, enforced, and implemented by party machines. Indeed, rewards by party machineries to 
assembly members—through party position or instrumental support for their personal political 
aspirations—provide these members with a potent incentive to lobby. It should also be noted that these 
rewards are handed out by the party and are closely tied to factors that are instrumental in their efforts to 
win support at the national polls. 
Vote Buying through the Political Accountability of Elected Members of the District 
Assembly 
“As a newly established assemblyman, it is not easy. The people are always on [him] and [he] does not 
want a failure.” —Newly elected assembly member, A52 
“If you don’t lobby, if you just keep quiet, you might get, but at the time they feel like giving it to you. And 
if you want to wait until they feel like giving it to you, you may not get anything.” 
—Assembly member, A30 
In 1998, Crook and Manor argued that the paradox of genuine political representation by the 
assembly people, combined with their lack of political power to bring resources to their communities, 
increasingly make this position undesirable. That the large majority of the members in the sample did not 
want to stand for re-election was argued to be representative of this negative view of the office. Yet we 
find that the position of an assembly member continues to be a contested and coveted one. Almost all 
elections in both sample districts had more than one candidate contesting elections. Indeed, most elections 
had more than one candidate, and the winning margins in several instances were small. Voters also saw 
the DA as legitimate and worthy of one’s participation. The election turnout in all the EAs in our sample 
exceeded the district average of 50 percent, with the number as high as 74 percent in some EAs. 
Assembly members, in some sense, also felt and were held accountable. While the residential proximity 
of the assembly member enabled the constituents to exert pressure on him/her, these constituents were 
also widely aware of the limited powers of the assembly members in the DA. As a result, their 
communities held them accountable for their “efforts” to bring resources, as evidenced by letters written 
to the DA and taking other members of the community along to the DA at the time that the lobbying 
request was being made. In fact, one local observer referred to assembly members as the “doorstep 
governors” of their communities. 
Indeed, this political accountability of assembly members plays a critical role in generating 
incentives for their lobbying efforts. Our case studies show that assembly members lobby anyone who 
could influence the allocation of resources to their community. Knowing that the DCE is concerned with 
securing the votes of their EAs means that DCEs present their first port of call for assembly persons. 
Drawing on party loyalties is also something that all members, vested as they are in these party 
machineries, do. The second port of call for assembly men is the door of nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), that sometimes implement public projects outside the purview of the DA. While the NGO 
public-goods agenda is largely predetermined, often times there are choices of location involved. 
Assembly members actively seek out and lobby these NGOs to bring these public goods to their 
communities. From the point of view of the assembly person, therefore, it makes sense to adopt a 
scattershot approach to lobbying, and to therefore lobby anyone and everyone who could matter. 
The case of a junior high school (JHS) in one of the study communities explicates this scattershot 
lobbying process. The assembly person first identified the need for a JHS in his community through his 
own observation as resident and parent. He then lobbied for the individual pieces necessary for the whole, 
drawing on pre-existing social networks, persuasion, and persistence to gain success. He approached the 15 
District Office of the Ghana Education Service (GES) to apply for official recognition and the assignment 
of teachers in his community. As a teacher, he had maintained good relationships with supervisors and 
former teachers in the GES district office He decided to “let them all be aware” about his community’s 
need for a school and told them “they should fight, always be on the director…so they also pushed their 
hands” and he was able to get the school.
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Elected members of the DA, therefore, have strong incentives to lobby for public resources. This 
lobbying in turn reflects, in part, the strong political accountability of these members to their constituents. 
 He also successfully lobbied the GES for classroom furniture. 
To secure funding for the school block, he lobbied both the director of education and the DCE. In 
particular, he made himself a nuisance of the DCE, visiting him anytime he was at the DA, which was at 
least weekly to pick up his paycheck. He also tried to activate the DCE’s sympathies as a former 
assembly member, reminding him that “as a newly established assemblyman it’s not easy. As this story 
demonstrates, one major strategy assembly people use to strengthen their lobbying is to exploit existing 
social capital. Networked relationships are particularly important. As this story demonstrates, these 
grassroots lobbyists must target the entire array of actors who can help their case, including the DCE, DA 
staff, MPs, line departments, NGOs, and fellow assembly people, especially the presiding member and 
Executive Committee of the DA. To do so, they may activate loyalties or call on old favors deriving from 
membership in schooling, employment, religion, ethnic group, hometown, or other networks. For 
example, one assembly person (respondent A30) attributed both her electoral success and the public 
goods she was able to secure early in her tenure to the fact that the DCE and her sister had been 
classmates and maintained a close relationship. The assembly person depicted above drew on professional 
connections to push his hand at the relevant line department. 
Vote Buying through the Capture of Bureaucratic Institutions of Local Government 
“Sometimes the nature of your problem will let you get the project.”—Assembly member, B8 
In several instances—such as in the construction of boreholes or the allocation of funds for 
fighting malaria—formal rules envisage that bureaucratic targeting by need, loosely defined, will 
determine within-district allocation of resources. However, these targeting mandates are uneven in their 
presence and implementation. While the directors of departments are thought to be most influential in 
proposing project selection, ultimately the DCE—as both chair of the Executive Committee and chief 
executive—must approve the project. As discussed above, the DCE can all too readily subvert 
bureaucratic targeting if it suits his/her other needs. 
However, to the extent that DCEs feel that their performance on development metrics affects the 
sustainability of their job, they have incentives to support this type of targeting for two reasons. First, they 
have reason to believe that the adequate implementation of needs-based projects can result in the flow of 
more resources to the district. In one of the study districts, the DCE referenced a major donor-funding 
modality in this respect. Project money for the District Wide Assistance Program was time bound, and the 
DCE felt that if she distributed contracts along partisan lines, she would likely be pressured to hire less 
skilled contractors, who, in doing shoddy or incomplete work may not meet the donor’s time line. This 
could impede future funding. Because this happened in three of the districts in the northern region in 
2007, she saw these sanctions as having real teeth, and she felt this was important because the District 
Assembly Common Fund (DACF) allocation to the district was too small on its own. The DA relies on 
donor money to deliver development, and in turn, to reflect the DCE’s competence in this realm. She felt 
that as a DCE “you must deliver; otherwise you cannot remain at your position.” 
Second, as the president’s man or woman in the district, the DCE is implicitly (or explicitly) held 
responsible for the performance of central-government flagship initiatives in his/her area. This metric 
means that the DCE must steer the bureaucracy to make investments that will help the area conform to 
                                                       
11 He was told that if he collected the names of all the students who would comprise the incoming class, they would consider 
his case.  16 
regional or national statistical trends. Indeed, in a few service-delivery cases in this study, the overriding 
logic appeared to be need-based targeting. The case of the Wantugu borehole is illustrative. Not only were 
women there spending hours daily searching for water during the dry season, but the community also had 
one of the highest incidences of guinea worm in the northern region. The community had a break of luck 
when one of the NGOs in the district drilled a borehole outside of town and hit a major aquifer. Seeing 
the high water yield, the DA’s Water and Sanitation Team sought funds for the mechanization of the 
borehole. After several donors with sanitation or infectious disease missions signed onto the project with 
tied funds, the DA staff informed the assembly member that he would be receiving the project and that he 
would need to organize community contributions of cash and labor. 
In the Wantugu borehole project, the motivating logic for project distribution appeared to be 
developmental and referent to the needs of beneficiary populations. Wantugu, in fact, presented a classic 
case of a problem that was visible and on the radar of the national government. For example, in 2008, the 
national press media covered the declining incidence of guinea worm in the northern regions of Ghana 
where it is endemic, citing star and lagging districts (for example, (Ghana News Agency,2008). Northern 
DCEs thus had a political interest in achieving this developmental outcome. This political interest resulted 
in the motivation to steer their DA to deliver its water infrastructure in a way that would best achieve this 
outcome. Enrollment in the NPP government’s National Health Insurance Scheme, School Capitation 
Grants, National Youth Employment, and a school feeding program are other examples of cases where 
the DCE’s political interest motivated the implementation of need-based targeting mandates. Of course, 
the DCE does still accrue political credit through the disbursement of projects whether or not they were 
actually targeted by need. 
Hence targeting mandates that are both visible and deemed to be of national importance are 
implemented. Mandates not deemed to be of importance are routinely subverted, and this subversion is 
often follows the logic of national politics. Once again, the imperatives of electoral politics and the 
political aspirations of the DCE determine how his/her discretion is used, and this, in turn, determines 
which planning mandates will be implemented and how. That bureaucrats are, for the most part, passive 
observers of this capture in not surprising. Although the DCE does not directly hire and fire the 
bureaucrats, he/she is their boss and could likely lobby the relevant central ministry in Accra to get them 
moved. 
Bureaucrats in the DA are likely to follow the DCE’s demands, especially in the absence of 
competing demands or sanctions from elsewhere. Hence the formal rules that stipulate some degree of 
need-based targeting of public goods are held hostage at the discretion of the DCE and on the basis of the 
vote buying imperatives. 
In summary, a vote buying model, characterized by informal institutions, defines the key political 
incentives that determine the targeting of local public goods. Importantly, the model of vote buying is not 
defined by the design of formal institutions alone. This landscape of political incentives includes both 
formal and informal institutions, as can be seen in Figure 2. It can been seen in this figure that the 
determinants of targeting when viewed exclusively through a formal lens (as in Figure 1) are starkly 
different than when the informal institutions are included as in Figure 2. 17 
Figure 2. De facto decentralization in Ghana – formal and informal institutions 
 
 
Source: Authors, based on key informant interviews. 
Note: DCE refers to District Chief Executive. 
It is also instructive to note that the effect of informal institutions is not uniform. In particular, 
while three of the four informal institutions of local government in Ghana lead to divergent policy 
outcomes; one institution—that of political accountability of assembly members—actually leads to an 
outcome envisaged by the formal reforms. 
We use Helmke and Levitsky’s (2004) framework of the effect of informal institutions on policy 
outcomes to identify the nature of four informal institutions. The powers of the office of the DCE 
represent a competing institution where the wide-ranging powers of the DCE structure incentives in ways 
that are incompatible with the formal institutional rules. The domination of the legislative and 
bureaucratic institutions of local government, in turn, defines an accommodating institution. In these 
accommodating institutions, incentives of partisan politics combined with the powers of the DCE create 
incentives for members of these two institutions of local government to act in a manner that alter the 
substantive effect of formal rules without directly violating them. Indeed, both these sets of institutions 
are created by actors who dislike outcomes generated by formal rules but are unable to change or openly 
violate them. In contrast, the political accountability of assembly members emerges as a substitutive 
institution, where local partisanship helps achieve what the formal institutions were designed to achieve 
but failed to do. 
We now use our case studies to examine if the patterns of public good provision in the EAs in our 
sample match the predictions of the model of vote buying through informal institutions. 18 
6.  CASE STUDIES 
While it is clear that a partisan political rationale defines informal institutions through which logic of vote 
buying obtains, it remains to be seen if the pattern of public resource allocation reflects this rationale. We 
now use our case studies in two northern Ghanaian districts to examine if the informal institution of vote 
buying is the key determinant of the targeting of local public goods and to examine whether the nature of 
the electoral markets shapes the political rationale and subsequent patterns of public goods allocation in 
the status quo. To do so, we examine data on the allocation of local public goods across the electoral areas 
(EAs) in our districts. Table 3 presents the results from district A, the swing voting district, and Table 4 
presents the results from district B, the core voting district. Ghana has two major political parties that 
have been in close elections over the last two decade—The National Patriotic Party (NPP) and the 
National Democratic Congress (NDC). The NPP held power from 2004 through 2008 and was in power at 
the same of this study in March 2008 
 We first examine the results from district A (Table 3). The data on party affiliation shows that 
the district is indeed a swing district. One of the three electoral areas (EA), EA3, elected a member of 
parliament (MP) from the opposition party, though the margin of victory was very small, and EA3 voted 
for an MP from the current ruling party, even though it was identified as being a weakly dominant area 
for the opposition, NDC. EA2 provides an interesting contrast: It is traditionally a stronghold for the NDC 
party. The tables show that the allocation of public goods across these District Assemblies (DAs) closely 
follows the voting patterns in the EA. Indeed, EA3, which voted for the ruling party (for MP) despite not 
being strong supporters of this party, got a plethora of public goods, ranging from several boreholes to a 
clinic. EEA1, which the opposition party won by small margin, was also awarded public goods. Notably, 
this included a small check dam—a high value and coveted investment in the semiarid regions of northern 
Ghana. EA2, which stands out as a core voting EA (for the opposition) within a largely swing voting 
district presents an interesting contrast. Indeed, this EA received almost no public goods, despite the fact 
the assembly members lobbied for several. The only project granted to this EAcame from a donor funded 
program, which was not implemented through the DA. The table also shows evidence of the intense 
lobbying for projects by these elected members of the DA. 
The results from district B (Table 4) present a stark contrast. Notably, all EAs in this district were 
core voters for the NDC in all parliamentary elections. Surprisingly, one of the DA members identified as 
belonging to the ruling NPP. It should be noted that within this core voting district, one part of the district 
was widely identified as being the home region of the DCE. Not surprisingly, the EA (EA4) that was 
located in this home region of the DCE received a very valuable public good: piped water to all 
communities in the EA. It is also interesting to note that the EA who had voted for the opposition party in 
a core voting district (EA5) received no public goods at all. Once again, there is strong evidence of 
lobbying from assembly members. In this district, however, it is interesting to note that the assembly 
members from the non-home regions lobbied far more than the member from the home region. 
In summary then, these tables suggest that the pattern of public good allocation closely tracks 
electoral imperatives and that the affiliations to political parties and voting patterns play a critical role. 
Indeed, swing district A got many more public goods overall than core voting district B. We argue that 
this is a result of the fact that granting these public goods in district A represented a way in which 
community allegiances and subsequent electoral support might be courted. The political imperatives in 
district B, in contrast, offered no such incentives. 19 
Table 3. District A 
Source: Case studies. 
Note. C1 and C2 represent communities 1 and 2, respectively; an MP is a member of parliament; NDC and NPP are the political 
parties of the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriot Party, respectively; an NGO is a nongovernmental organization; 
pop refers to population. 
  Electoral Area 1 
Voters: 482 
2 communities  
Electoral Area 2 
Voters: 2,153 
5 communities 
Electoral Area 3 
Voters: 931 
6 communities 
ELECTION  2006 -- Turnout: 61.4 percent 
3 candidates 
2006 – Turnout: 57.5 percent  
5 candidates  
2006 – Turnout: 75.3 percent 




•  NDC for MP 
•  Small margin: swing 
voting community  
NDC stronghold  
 




(of assembly member) 
Not publicly partisan  NDC  NPP 
COMMUNITY  Community 1 
Pop: 665 
Community 2  
Pop: 890  
Community 1  









1.  C1-C2 Dam 
 
2.  Road 





1.  C2 Clinic 
2.  Boreholes: Most of 
the communities 
3.  Grinding mills: All 
but one community 
4.  Tractor from 
assembly to pick up 





Lobbied for 3-unit 
classroom block  
School feeding center in 
C1 
 
1.  Lobbied for teachers’ 
quarters in C1 
2.  School block in C2 
Boreholes 





Beekeeping  20 
Table 4. District B  
Source: Case studies, Districts A and B. 
Note. C1 and C2 represent communities 1 and 2, respectively; hh  refers to households, VIP is a  Ventilation Improved Pit toilet , 
UNDP is the United Nations Development Program), UNICEF is the (United Nations Children’s Fund), and HIPC is the (Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative) 
  Electoral Area 4 
Voters: 3,303 
8 communities 
(Home region of the DCE) 
Electoral Area 5 
Voters: 1,058 
2 sections of a community 
 




ELECTION  2006—Turnout: 57.0 percent 
2 candidates 
2006—Turnout: 47.0 percent 
3 candidates  
2006—Turnout: 43.6 percent 












(of assembly member) 
NDC  NPP  NDC 
COMMUNITIES  Community 1 
Pop: 2,505 
Community 2 







1.  Piped water system to 
all communities  
  1.  Electricity poles 
provided by the 





1.  Organized 
community labor to 
dig a dam 
1.  Sanitation assistance 
(VIP) garbage 
removal truck 
2.  Loans for women 
from HIPC fund 
earmarked for 
women 
3.  Community labor—
cleaned up KVIP 
1.  Wires to provide 
electricity, repair of 
water pipes in 4 
communities, road  
2.  UNDP repaired 
pipes  
3.  UNICEF provided 
wires 
4.  School built through 
European Union 
micro projects  21 
7.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, our case studies of the targeting of local public goods in two northern Ghanaian districts 
tell a story of how national political imperatives capture the provision of community-based public goods. 
This capture, while reflected to some degree in the design of formal institutions of local government, is 
primarily implemented through informal institutions of vote buying. These informal institutions of vote 
buying, in turn, are embedded in the imperatives of partisan politics. 
 The targeting of local public goods in the current status quo is then tied to the nature of these 
electoral markets. Moreover, this targeting is mediated and enforced by the local machineries of political 
parties. Following this electoral rationale, the swing district in our sample received several local public 
goods, and several communities in the district shared in this allocation. In the core voting district, public 
good provision was much more limited, and this provision resembled a clientelistic transfer to the home 
region of the district chief executive (DCE). 
Our case studies also tell a story of an informal institution that depends in no small measure on 
the political aspirations of individual agents. The desire of DCEs to gain the ticket for member of 
parliament and the desire of assembly members to move up a very similar political ladder are critical 
elements of this institution. Indeed, such aspirations—set within this partisan and politically competitive 
environment—are central to the informal institution of vote buying. While the divergence from intended 
policy outcomes on account of these informal institutions is not surprising per se and while this can be 
inferred from the formal agency—that is, the central government in local government affairs—the 
questions of how and why the divergent outcomes were obtained are of critical importance. When viewed 
through the lens of formal accountability alone, this divergence would be attributed to imperfections in 
local political accountability, and a commonly recommended solution would be to make this central 
agency politically accountable in some way. 
While formal accountability is weak or absent, the targeting of local public-resource allocation is 
not merely characterized by this weak or absent formal accountability. Instead, this targeting follows the 
logic of the informal accountability embedded in the institution of vote buying, and this institution defines 
a complex and potentially perverse set of accountability relations. Indeed, while the central agent does not 
govern through the imperatives of local political accountability, he/she follows vote buying imperatives 
defined by these informal institutions. With partial decentralization alongside a strong informal-party 
presence in local government affairs, the political aspirations of local government actors who represent 
the agency of the central government are always likely to be tied to incentives provided by these party 
machineries. Making the formal institution of the central agency or agent accountable, while ignoring the 
presence and persistence of informal institutions that run counter to local accountability, is therefore 
unlikely to effect any change in formal accountability. Indeed, we argue that in these contexts, the same 
partisan political incentives are likely to characterize the central agency within the local government—
regardless of whether this agent is formally elected or nominated. 
This finding finds resonance in a current policy debate focused on the question of making the 
position of the DCE an elected one. One prominent group, led by donors and multilateral agencies, argue 
that making these position elected is a precondition for local accountability. Local observers of the 
system, however, argue that such election, amidst sharply partisan national politics, would undermine a 
fair flow of resources to districts. In particular, they argue that home districts of the DCE of the ruling 
party will get a disproportionately large share of the transfers from the central government. Indeed, our 
results suggest that such national political partisanship has even larger implications and that it shapes the 
informal institutions that, in turn, determine local targeting outcomes. Given partial decentralization, 
alongside the role of party machineries and partisan politics, it could well be argued that an elected head 
of the local government will face the same political incentives as the appointed DCE currently does. More 
generally the proponents of formal accountability rarely consider the fact that the micropolitics 
engendered by vote buying could engender incentives that run counter to broad-based accountability in 
the provision of public goods, even with a formally politically accountable actor. 22 
Our case studies also point to the presence of a critical, and often missing element, of several 
decentralization reforms—that of genuine political representation of villages or communities. Assembly 
people in our sample, though effectively without power to effect public goods provision, constantly elicit 
information on community needs and are indeed the doorstep governors of these communities. They then 
exploit extant political motivations of vote buying, draw on their social networks, and use their political 
capital to bring development projects or community-level public goods to their constituents. The 
incomplete nature of the formal rules governing subdistrict allocation, combined with the overarching 
power of the DCE, however, restricts them from making the case for political relevance of their 
communities through the formal institution of the DA. Instead, these members lobby anyone who could 
matter. A formal subdistrict allocation formula, which does not exist at present, could lay the basis for a 
drawing upon this extant political accountability, even within a partially decentralized system. The 
success of such a formula will, however, clearly depend on increasing the de facto power of the assembly 
people relative to the DCE. Given partisan local politics, reducing the relative powers of the DCE in 
affecting the targeting of local public resources might be done more effectively through increasing the 
power of elected assembly members. One way of doing so would be to implement a formula-based 
transfer to all electoral areas (EAs). This formula too, might face implementation problems on account of 
partisan local politics, as previous studies have shown (see Banful 2008). This suggests that a formula 
would require third party monitoring. 
Overall, these results suggest that any impetus to institutional change must take into account the 
informal institution of vote buying. Specifically, in the presence of this institution, reforming the formal 
rule of local government is unlikely to wield any influence on outcomes. Finally, collecting data on 
allocation of public goods—at the levels of both EAs and communities within these EAs—would make 
this public resource allocation more visible. This visibility, in turn, could improve the incentives that 
DCEs face to achieve need-based performance metrics, even though these incentives might be restricted 
to politically relevant public-goods programs. In the absence of such political relevance, leveraging the 
fact that the political careers of local government actors are built through the use of district funds can be 
useful. For example, in the case of district B, donor-fund modalities were cited as a reason for the quick 
execution of public goods construction. Building on this example, making the flow of funds to the 
district—whether from the central government or from donors—contingent on the achievement of some 
measure of needs-based allocation could effect an improvement in the targeting of local public goods. 23 
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